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The Tally Newsletter, Issue 52

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The Tally Newsletter, Issue 52

November 17, 2021

monetsupply
Nov 17, 2021
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The Tally Newsletter, Issue 52

newsletter.tally.xyz

Welcome back for issue 52 of the Tally Newsletter, a publication focused on all things decentralized governance. We’ll keep you updated on key proposals, procedural changes, newly launched voting systems, shifting power dynamics, and anything else you need to know to be an informed citizen. 

This week cover:

  • Mochi Protocol’s Curve Wars Coup and Ecosystem Response

  • Fei’s Proposed Rari Capital Acquisition

Plus quick ecosystem and product updates!


Convex and Curve React to Mochi Protocol

TL;DR: While Mochi’s dangerous vote buying tactics caused widespread concern, the response raises important questions about minority voter protections.

Late last week, we witnessed one of the boldest power plays yet in defi governance. An upstart lending based stablecoin project, Mochi, was seeking to expand its usage through a listing and rewards pool on Curve Finance. But the manner in which they pushed this through led to serious risk for users and a strong backlash from other stakeholders.

Twitter avatar for @VotiumProtocol
Votium @VotiumProtocol
@VotiumProtocol 🤝 @MochiDeFi Mochi has proposed a gauge for their USDM pool. 0.25% of the not yet released $MOCHI token supply will be distributed (over 12 months) to anyone who votes yes or is delegated to Votium as of SEP 30th 00:00 UTC.
9:08 AM ∙ Sep 29, 2021
39Likes11Retweets

 It started innocuously enough, with Mochi releasing a governance token to help incentivize LPs and usage similarly to the USDP and MIM debt backed stablecoin systems. But after initially bootstrapping demand by bribing Curve and Convex Finance voters to add rewards for Mochi’s USDM stablecoin pool, Mochi used the team’s 99% share of MOCHI token supply to mint additional USDM on their own platform, swap through the Curve pool for DAI, and purchase CVX tokens to permanently vote for pool boosts.

Twitter avatar for @AndreCronjeTech
Andre Cronje @AndreCronjeTech
This is amazingly scammy; 1. Be Mochi 2. Incentivize USDM/3pool 3. Get $100mm liquidity 4. Mint free Mochi 5. Use Mochi to mint 46mm USDM 6. Swap USDM to DAI 7. Buy 46mm worth of CVX 8. Use CVX to vote more incentives 9. Liquidity increases more 10. Repeat ad infinitum
Twitter avatar for @degenomix
DEGΞNOMIX @degenomix
$CVX god candle to $48 (from $28) thanks to 6 x 1000 $ETH market buys https://t.co/y5t8TeO2gX https://t.co/u20E7eUfQ8
12:14 AM ∙ Nov 11, 2021
866Likes188Retweets

 This created high risk for USDM holders, who now were reliant on the value of MOCHI collateral backing their stablecoins. Considering that Mochi protocol locked their purchased CVX tokens for the maximum 3 months for voting boost, it would not be possible to liquidate this position to recapitalize USDM reserves either. This is in addition to a series of other issues with Mochi, including a “multisig” requiring only 1 signer and hard coded price for the MOCHI token that didn’t reflect true market value.

Twitter avatar for @boredGenius
zefram.eth (trois, trois) @boredGenius
Dug around the mochi contracts and it's comedy gold - Price oracle for $mochi is literally just a number set by a hot wallet (who needs chainlink lmao) - The mochi token is upgradeable by a 1-of-3 multisig ("multisig") with no timelock - The same multisig owns 99.5% of all mochi
9:46 AM ∙ Nov 11, 2021
946Likes177Retweets

The purchase caught several other protocols off guard, with KeeperDAO, Frax Finance, and OlympusDAO all in various stages of considering purchases of CRV or CVX tokens for incentive boosts. Mochi’s centralized governance and lending mechanisms allowed the core team to move faster than competing DAOs, who needed to gain token holder support for treasury investments. This presents an interesting problem for DAO merger activity, where open governance processes lead to disadvantage versus more agile, centralized competitors.

Twitter avatar for @CurveFinance
Curve Finance @CurveFinance
Emergency DAO kills USDM gauge after discovering some suspicious hybrid + liquidity activity. The main DAO is still able to object and resurrect the gauge of course. Details:
gov.curve.fiThe Curve Emergency DAO has killed the USDM gaugeSummary: Last night, some unusual price action on CVX was brought to our attention. This came from an address which had just swapped 46M USDM to DAI in a factory pool. After some research, along with Yearn and Convex, we realised those were the actions of the person behind the Mochi protocol. …
11:27 AM ∙ Nov 11, 2021
568Likes101Retweets

Due to widespread concern for governance capture and LP losses, the Curve emergency multisig (made up of unaffiliated community members) killed the CRV rewards for the USDM pool. While the Curve DAO has the power to overturn the multisig action if they wish, this left Mochi’s voting power essentially worthless, and with no more rewards to support stablecoin demand and a loss of confidence the price of USDM crashed as the pool became progressively more unbalanced.

Twitter avatar for @MochiDeFi
Mochi Inu @MochiDeFi
Image
6:21 PM ∙ Nov 16, 2021
21Likes5Retweets

Following Curve's decision to deactivate USDM pool rewards, Convex voters took the more controversial action of revoking Mochi’s CVX voting power directly. While the stealth token purchase raised concern about a possible governance takeover, this is the first time voting power has been actively revoked from a single target within a defi DAO. 

Twitter avatar for @bantg
banteg @bantg
"We don't like that person so let's vote to seize their tokens" is probably the line one shouldn't cross.
Twitter avatar for @ameensol
ameen.eth @ameensol
if a country used its military to conquer a neighboring bitcoin mining operation, would Bitcoin reject their hashpower? if a country used its hackers to steal ETH staking keys, would Ethereum hard fork to slash their stakes? if a scammer locks ill-gotten governance tokens... https://t.co/teaszre6Uw
5:48 PM ∙ Nov 12, 2021
175Likes22Retweets

Underlying tokens were not seized and Mochi will be able to reclaim the CVX at the end of the standard 3 month lock period. But this could become a dangerous precedent if vote revocation becomes more widely accepted, as it could systematically disenfranchise minority token holders.

Twitter avatar for @mewn21
mewny @mewn21
damn dude you can vote to remove another token holders voting power lol while being applied to a questionable person may seem fair in this instance, its again a really bad precedent... imagine a vote is held to sanction you because the majority deemed u a bad actor
Twitter avatar for @ConvexFinance
Convex Finance @ConvexFinance
A new proposal regarding recent events surrounding Mochi Defi has been posted on Convex Finance Snapshot. A dedicated discussion channel in the Discord will be created for conversation around this proposal. https://t.co/r6ql36NYWS
5:10 PM ∙ Nov 12, 2021
316Likes133Retweets

Fei and Rari Capital Consider Protocol Merge

TL;DR: The proposal targets synergies between Rari’s permissionless money markets and Fei’s stablecoin and reserve liquidity.

Just a week after Fei raised partnership deals with Balancer and Tokemak, we’re already seeing new crypto M&A activity. In this case, Fei protocol is proposing a full merger with Rari Capital, the maker of the Fuse money market protocol. This calls for deeper integration than the earlier Fei partnerships, with the RGT token eventually being swapped for TRIBE and both projects operating under unified governance. 

Twitter avatar for @jai_bhavnani
Jai Bhavnani @jai_bhavnani
Me and @joey__santoro have been cooking up a crazy proposal for RGT and TRIBE. ⚡️ Merge $RGT and $TRIBE to create a DeFi powerhouse ⚡️ What does this mean? Why am I excited about this? What does this mean for DeFi? Let's explore 👇🏽
7:36 PM ∙ Nov 16, 2021
383Likes76Retweets

In this sense, it is more similar to last week’s Gnosis and xDAI merger proposal, and there are some parallels between the two deals and community response. In both cases the merger involves a large, well capitalized acquirer and much smaller target. xDAI and Rari communities have shown some reservations about the deals, which could dilute their voting power and autonomy, while also tying them to a larger and heavier organization which may have less upside potential. But compared with the Gnosis and xDAI proposal, there may be a stronger business case for the proposed Rari and Fei tie up.

Twitter avatar for @joey__santoro
Joey Santoro @joey__santoro
@UNSEO_ATREIDES @jai_bhavnani We are taking in community feedback. I will mention that TRIBE brings a massive treasury of over $1bn in non-native assets which is a major selling point for $RGT holders.
2:20 AM ∙ Nov 17, 2021

While Fei protocol is primarily a stablecoin project, they have been expanding into a new framework of “liquidity as a service”. This allows for deploying FEI stablecoins and other liquid assets from Fei’s protocol controlled value into defi applications or supporting external projects’ liquidity needs (see the proposed collaboration with Ondo Finance for another example). To date, Fei has already deployed over $30 million into Rari capital pools, and further user deposits in Fei’s fuse pool take the total liquidity contributed into hundreds of millions.

Source: Fei Analytics

A merger could allow for more FEI and PCV assets to flow into Rari’s fuse pools, but more importantly it also helps Rari meet key capital needs including contributor funding and expenses, along with repaying funds owed to users from a previous hack. So while the proposed terms are for a roughly even $1 to $1 swap of RGT to TRIBE, taking on Rari’s debt means that Fei is still effectively paying a premium for the acquisition. Whether this is enough to satisfy RGT holders remains to be seen, with sentiment in the Rari Capital forums less enthusiastic so far versus the Fei protocol community.


In Brief: 

  • Saddle Finance releases SDL governance token, granting 18% of airdrop to Curve community to try to ease strained ties:

Twitter avatar for @CurveFinance
Curve Finance @CurveFinance
Well, that's an interesting conclusion of the drama. Saddle issues the token and suddenly grants 3% of the supply (18% of the airdrop) to veCRV holders (vested over 2 years). Maybe this can be considered a "let's be frens" request. Wdyt guys?
Twitter avatar for @saddlefinance
Saddle @saddlefinance
Wen token? Now token. Introducing the Saddle (SDL) token: https://t.co/tOIj3v8fWj 👆 SDL tokenomics, airdrop deets, how to earn SDL, governance, and L2 launch. It’s all finally here 🤠 🤩 🤓 🎨 Saddle Creators artist @edelghost (IG: https://t.co/yz0aDEtDU8) https://t.co/r0ysfWDrbm
10:28 PM ∙ Nov 16, 2021
192Likes23Retweets
  • Nick Johnson from ENS shares how to create a snapshot space for delegates to poll their constituents:

Twitter avatar for @nicksdjohnson
nick.eth @nicksdjohnson
Building on an idea by @BrantlyMillegan and with the help of @SnapshotLabs, anyone who delegates their $ENS to me can now create and vote on proposals using their delegated tokens in a private Snapshot space:
snapshot.orgSnapshot
11:08 PM ∙ Nov 14, 2021
131Likes21Retweets
  • Cream Finance shares compensation plan for money market losses: ​​

Twitter avatar for @CreamdotFinance
Cream Finance 🍦 @CreamdotFinance
We will distribute 1,453,415 CREAM tokens to impacted users. We are utilizing remaining CREAM tokens within the treasury, and removing the project team's remaining CREAM token allocation. There will be no further CREAM allocations to the team.
2:43 PM ∙ Nov 13, 2021
123Likes13Retweets
  • Fire Eyes DAO makes proposal to transfer ENS admin privileges from multisig to community governance:

Twitter avatar for @blockchainjames
James Waugh 🔥ᴗ🔥 🇵🇹 @blockchainjames
🔥_🔥 is excited to present an important proposal to the ENS delegates, token holders and @ensdomains community: Transferring ENS Treasury & Contract Ownership from the ENS multisig to the ENS DAO Read more: discuss.ens.domains/t/social-propo…
discuss.ens.domains[Social] Proposal: Transfer ENS Treasury and Contract OwnershipSummary Transfer ENS treasury and contract ownership from the ENS Multisig to ENS DAO. Abstract With the recent launch of the ENS DAO and $ENS token, it is now time for key governance powers of ENS to be transferred from the ENS root multisig to the ENS DAO. 🔥_ 🔥(Fire Eyes DAO) has taken a cen…
5:21 PM ∙ Nov 17, 2021
125Likes32Retweets
  • DYDX considers launching grants program:

Twitter avatar for @AntonioMJuliano
Antonio | dYdX 🦔 @AntonioMJuliano
Excited to see a proposal led by Reverie to create the first dYdX Grants Program 💯 I urge community members to participate in the discussion and support the proposal ✅ This is a critical step towards aggressive & efficient spend of the treasury 💸🥇 forums.dydx.community/proposal/discu…
Twitter avatar for @AntonioMJuliano
Antonio | dYdX 🦔 @AntonioMJuliano
So far, DAO community treasuries are being criminally underused across the space 😕 Whichever protocols figure out how to aggressively spend their community treasury on effective growth programs will win 💸🚀 👇
6:14 PM ∙ Nov 12, 2021
114Likes19Retweets

Thanks for joining us for Tally Newsletter issue 52. Be sure to check out the Tally governance app and join us on Discord for the latest updates!

Anything we missed? New developments or protocols you’d like to see covered? Drop us a line at newsletter@withtally.com 

Best,

Nate, Tally

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